What's wrong with social simulations?

Eckhart Arnold

1 Introduction
2 Simulation without validation in agent-based models
3 How a model works that works: Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model
4 How models fail: The Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model
5 An ideology of modeling
6 Conclusions


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